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The Greek Debt Crisis: The Need for "Heroic"
Economic Policy Reforms in the European
Economic and Monetary Union
PETER ROBBINS*
ABSTRACT
Greece is in the midst of a devastating economic and financial crisis
that the European Union has been trying ardently to resolve since the
default of Lehman Brothers in 2008. A significant number of other
European Union (EU) Member States are also in crisis due to various
state-level economic and monetary causes. Meanwhile, the European
Union has consistently used the existing treaty articles and legislation
within its competence to impose traditional and homogenized austerity
measures on highly indebted Member States, most notably Greece. In
sum, the European Union has zealously advocated for fiscal
conservatism driven by the German "diber-fear" of inflation, which the
European Union firmly believes is not only an indicator of economic
instability, but also an ineffective debt reduction policy. The discord
sown by such a policy at the EU level is evident even without detailed
economic analysis: inflation, wages, unemployment, debt, and other
economic indicators are affected, and often controlled, by a wide variety
of factors, both global and domestic. This Note will deal chiefly with the
economic and monetary causes of the crisis in Greece, and it will briefly
discuss the crisis in Spain. While an understanding that each crisis is
different would induce a reasonable expectation that each of those
countries-as well as any other Member State in need of assistance-
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would have been prescribed a tailored solution to the extent that is
practicable,this Note will explain that this has not been the case.
INTRODUCTION

European Union (EU)-imposed austerity measures always consist of
the same basic principles: raising taxes, cutting government spending,
and paying down sovereign debt. The theory, which is generally similar
to the one promoted by U.S. President Herbert Hoover during his term
immediately following the Stock Market Crash of 1929, is one of
tightening the fiscal belt.' Of course, most agree that Hoover's policies
exacerbated the Great Depression, including the 2008 winner of the
Nobel Prize in Economics, Paul Krugman: "Most economists, to the
extent that they think about the subject at all, regard the Great
Depression of the 1930s as a gratuitous, unnecessary tragedy. If only
Herbert Hoover hadn't tried to balance the budget in the face of an
economic slump. . . ."2
This Note will investigate the ineffectiveness of the European
Union's austerity measures as applied to Greece, propose an alternative
solution, and suggest possible legal and political reforms by the
European Union and its Member States to make the proposed solution
viable and legal. Further, this Note will examine one particular
austerity measure that has been applied to Greece, labor law reform,
and discuss its compatibility with the proposed alternative solution.
Each of these subsections informs an overarching discussion about the
strengths and limitations of a global governance system like the
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
I. BACKGROUND: SETTING THE TABLE FOR CRISIS
At the heart of the EMU's economic problems are gaps in its
structure and issues that were ignored or not fully considered when the
EMU took effect in 1999. The principal requirement that Member
States wanting to join the EMU had to meet was a budget deficit of 3
percent per year or less.3 Germany was profoundly influential in the
process leading up to EMU. As such, the common view of how the
1. Brian Blackstone, ECB Makes Case for Belt-Tightening, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10,
2010, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704644404575481161959667700.
2. PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008,
at 3 (2009).

3. Kathleen R. McNamara, Globalization, Institutions, and Convergence: Fiscal
Adjustment in Europe, in GOVERNANCE INA GLOBAL EcoNOMY: POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN
TRANSITION 332, 339 (Miles Kahler & David A. Lake eds., 2003).
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European Union came up with the specific figure of 3 percent as the
prerequisite target is that, rather than reflecting an economic necessity
for monetary union, it was a political concession the other Member
States offered to Germany to persuade it to join the EMU.4 In fact, Paul
De Grauwe and Andrew Moravcsik have argued that Germany's
motivation for the 3 percent deficit target was "to restrict the number
and nature of participants in EMU so as to ensure [it] a dominant
position and macroeconomic policies more closely in line with
Bundesbank tradition."5 Germany was already operating within or near
the 3 percent limit at that time, and its traditionally strong economy
was thriving.6 If indebted countries had to raise taxes and cut spending
in preparation for the EMU, Germany, already the largest economy in
Europe, would be assured a great deal of influence. Indeed, as the
Member States were preparing for the EMU, the idea that Germany
would dominate economic policy standards was pervasive. In the words
of Francesco Giavazzi and Alberto Giovannini: "Germany [was] the
centre country and [ran] monetary policy for the whole system."7
After the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, several Member
States were able to reduce their deficit ratios dramatically. Greece
experienced one of the largest drops in deficit, as between 1992 and the
time it was approved for the EMU in 2000, it had decreased its deficit
by 10 percent.8 The shocking 10 percent figure can be attributed to
intense short-term deficit reduction strategies by Greece in an effort to
meet the 3 percent target (as well as to dishonest bookkeeping by
Greece, which will be discussed later). The market's reaction to the
prospect of countries joining the EMU was the lowering of interest
rates, thus making short-term borrowing strategies possible.9 Normally,
highly indebted countries are forced to sell long-term bonds because
their debt causes the risk premiums on short-term interest rates to be
4. Id. at 340; see also Paul De Grauwe, The Political Economy of Monetary Union in
Europe, 16 WORLD EcoN. 653 (1993) (discussing Germany's influence on EMU goals); Paul
De Grauwe, Reforming the Transition to EMU, 199 PRINCETON U. ESSAYS INT'L FIN. 16
(1996) (discussing Germany's influence on EMU goals). See generally ANDREW
MORAVCSIK, THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE: SOCIAL PURPOSE AND STATE POWER FROM MESSINA
TO MAASTRICHT (1998) (discussing formation of the EMU).
5. McNamara, supranote 3, at 340.
6. See id. at 345, fig.13.2 (showing the fiscal positions of countries in the European
Union during the years 1992-1998).
7. KENNETH DYSON, ELUSIVE UNION: THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY

UNION IN EUROPE 329 (1994) (quoting Francesco Giavazzi and Alberto Giovannini, Models
of the EMS: Is Europe a Greater Deutschmark Area?, in GLOBAL MACROECONOMICS:
POLICY CONFLICT AND COOPERATION 237 (Ralph C. Bryant and Richard Portes eds.,
1987)).

8. See McNamara, supra note 3, at 343.
9. See id. at 346.
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too high for them to afford. In short, Greece executed policies
(supplemented by dishonest bookkeeping) to meet fiscal responsibility
by 2000, but Greece did not have a sustainable fiscal responsibility plan
after that point.
And while Greece had not adequately prepared for the years
following the beginning of the EMU, the EMU itself did not have
adequate means to enforce the deficit requirements it had imposed on
all Member States. In 1999, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) came
into effect.' 0 The SGP has two limbs: the multilateral surveillance
procedure and the excessive deficit procedure. 1 These tiered levels of
the SGP operate to notify a Member State that it has failed to meet the
convergence criteria, with the most realistic discipline being publication
of the violation to the rest of the European Union.12 The theory was that
the fear of public reprimand would persuade the national central banks
and national governments to be fiscally responsible.13
This system proved unenforceable and failed to deter several
Member States from being fiscally irresponsible. The ineffectiveness of
the SGP was evident soon after its implementation, when both France
and Germany violated its fiscal restrictions in 2003.14 As the two most
politically and economically powerful countries in the EMU, France and
Germany were able to convince the European Union not to impose the
SGP-prescribed sanctions on them.15 So, only four years after the
implementation of the SGP, the EMU's two most important economies
had "flouted" the system, bringing the SGP into "disrepute." 6
Around the time when the French and Germans dodged the SGP's
sanctions, Italian economist Giampaolo Galli anticipated irresponsible
actions to come out of countries like Greece, prompting economists
Fabian Amtenbrink and Jakob De Haan to comment:
One may wonder then why Member States should feel
obliged to pursue economic policies which they consider
restrictive and potentially harmful for economic outlook
and/or inconvenient in the light of the political cycle.
Indeed, as Galli argues, there is a "strong temptation for
governments to run high deficits since the costs, in
10. See Lauren Macias, The Greek Debt Crisis: The Weaknesses of an Economic and
Monetary Union, 14 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 251, 260 (2012).
11. See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BIlRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 70809 (5th ed. 2011).

12. See id. at 708.
13. See Macias, supra note 10, at 262.
14. See CRAIG & DE BPRcA, supra note 11, at 709-10.

15. Id.
16. See id. at 710.
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terms of higher interests or inflation, are spread over
the whole Eurozone."17
So, although the EMU was warned that Member States could
erroneously view a common currency tied to a large group of other
Member States as a shield from instability, thereby encouraging risky
domestic economic policy, the EMU disregarded that possibility. "When
one asked how Europe would handle situations in which some
economies were doing well while others were slumping .

.

. the official

answer, more or less, was that all the nations of the euro area would
follow sound policies, so that there would be no such 'asymmetric
shocks[]'. . . ."18 A problem inherent in a global governance system like
the EMU, where many governments with distinct economic policies
share a common monetary policy, is that in times of economic instability
there is little to no flexibility for a Member State to borrow from the
Central Bank without such actions negatively affecting the other
Member States in the monetary union.19 Because of this, the other
countries will oppose such borrowing. Krugman discusses the
limitations that a Member State like Spain would face when trying to
regain competitiveness after wages have risen too high (inflation): "One
way to get there is to persuade or push Spanish workers into accepting
lower wages. That is in fact the only way to get there if Spain and
Germany have the same currency, or if Spain's currency is, as a matter
of unalterable policy, fixed against Germany's currency." 20 The proposed
alternative solution to the EMU's economic crisis that will follow is, in
part, an attempt to offer a more favorable option to a country in Spain's
position.
II. AUSTERITY: THE GLOBALIZED DEFAULT CURE FOR DEBT

A. The European Union's Strategy of Austerity Since 2008
In his book published in the immediate wake of the global economic
crisis of 2008, Krugman noted with relief that "most nations have at
least avoided doing the Herbert Hoover thing of raising taxes and

17. See Fabian Amtenbrink & Jakob De Haan, Economic Governance in the European
Union: Fiscal Policy Discipline Versus Flexibility, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1075, 1094

(2003); see also Briefing from Giampaolo Galli, Chief Economist, Confindustria and LUISS
Univ., Rome, to the Comm. for Econ. & Monetary Affairs of the Eur. Parl. (2003).
18. PAUL KRUGMAN, END THIS DEPRESSION Now! 173 (2012).
19. See id. at 179-180.
20. Id. at 169.
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cutting spending as the economy slumps." 21 Unfortunately, in the years
since Krugman wrote those words, the European Union has forced
Greece, Spain, and other EMU countries to raise taxes and cut spending
as the economy slumps-austerity measures that have been widely
ineffective.
Essentially, the Troika-meaning
the European
Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF)-has agreed to bail out Greece and a few other
Member States in exchange for their agreement to the terms of a
Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) requiring commitments to
implement severe austerity measures. 22
The European Union's response to the Greek crisis in the form of
austerity measures has drawn the ire of more than a few notable
economists, one of whom was 2001 winner of the Nobel Prize in
Economics Joseph E. Stiglitz:
Government money spent on structural reform - helping
move resources from old, less competitive sectors to new
sectors - stimulates the economy, and the higher
incomes give individuals and firms the resources to
adapt to the changed economy. In many of the European
countries facing austerity, there is simultaneously a
demand for faster structural reforms. The structural
reforms that they often focus upon do not entail
government assistance in moving the economy into new
sectors. Rather, what is referred to is a mixture of
counterproductive measures (lowering minimum wages)
and rent-reducing measures (like more effective
enforcement of competition laws and reducing licensing
restrictions), with measures of ambiguous effect rushed privatizations that have, in many countries,
actually increased rents and impaired efficiency. These
reforms are topped off with aspirational messages - to
be more competitive. Even were these reforms to occur
at historically unprecedented paces, it would be years
before the full benefits were realized. But these reforms
at best (when they are well designed, and many are not)
improve the supply side of the economy; . . . however, the

weaknesses in the economy today stem from the demand
side, and a cutback in workers' income, either as a result
of firing workers or lower wages, simply lowers total
21. KRUGMAN, supra note 2, at 195.
22. Joanna Pagones, The European Union's Response to the Sovereign Debt Crisis: Its
Effect on Labor Relations in Greece, 36 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 1517, 1521 (2013).
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demand, lowering GDP and weakening the capacities of
those who have to make the structural transformations
to do so. 28
Considering Greece and Spain's current unemployment figures (26.4
percent and 23.67 percent, respectively, as of July 2014), Stiglitz's
Keynesian argument about the importance of reform on the demand
side is all the more compelling. 24 In the context of unemployment, the
supply variable is workers and the demand variable is jobs. In both
Spain and Greece, the supply variable is in a state of staggering surplus
(as evidenced by their high unemployment). While the wage-lowering
and rent-reducing measures currently in place might decrease inflation
throughout those countries, when coupled with the other austerity
measures like increased taxes and decreased government spending,
there is nothing else available to solve the problem of unemployment.
Moreover, unemployment is devastating, whether viewed from the
Keynesian perspective of Stiglitz or from that of the Friedman-inspired
"sound-money" 25 proponents of the Bundesbank and the ECB.
But, as far as the European Union is concerned, the fact that
Greece, Spain, and others must deal with these difficult economic
conditions is part of the process. As Krugman writes, "[t]he problem of
dealing with the crisis is often couched in moral terms: nations are in
trouble because they have sinned, and they must redeem themselves
through suffering." 26 For the purposes of this Note, assume the "sin" to
which Krugman refers is an excess of debt in violation of the SGP.
While the Greek crisis was caused in large part by the imprudent
borrowing and spending of the government, Spain's debt-to-GDP ratio
was actually in the process of falling before 2008.27 Instead, Spain's
crisis was caused by the burst of its housing bubble. In the words of the
BBC:
After Spain joined the euro, the country experienced a
long boom, underpinned by a housing bubble, financed
by cheap loans to builders and homebuyers . . . . So,
23. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY 235 (2012).
24. Greece Unemployment Rate, TRADING ECONOMICS, http://www.tradingeconomics.
com/greece/unemployment-rate (last visited Nov. 3, 2014); Spain Unemployment Rate,
TRADING ECONOMICS, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/spain/unemployment-rate (last
visited Nov. 3, 2014).
25. See DYSON, supra note 7, at 233.
26. KRUGMAN, supranote 17, at 179.
28,
2012,
12:44
PM),
(Sept.
27. Eurozone
Crisis Explained, BBC
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17549970 (exploring the causes of the Spanish fiscal
crisis).
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although the Spanish government had relatively low
debts, it has had to borrow heavily to deal with the
effects of the property collapse, the recession and the
worst unemployment rate in the eurozone. 28
Regardless, both Spain and Greece are currently facing severe austerity
measures demanded by the European Union. This is what Krugman
refers to as "Europe's Big Delusion: it's the belief that Europe's crisis
was essentially caused by fiscal irresponsibility." 29 Because austerity
measures are justified by the moral fault reasoning above, Greece
committed the debt "sins" while Spain did not, and the two countries are
both subject to EU-imposed austerity measures; Krugman calls this a
"Hellenization" of the problem.30
Unfortunately, the European Union appears to have prioritized
stopping the spread of the economic crisis over actually helping to fix
the crisis in Greece and improve the conditions of the Greek people. As
discussed above, when preparing for the start of the EMU in the 1990s,
the European Union implemented a system with the goal of bringing all
the future EMU states' economic policies in harmony. At that time, the
Member States seemed to embrace the idea that the strength of a
monetary union depended on the collective efforts of all the countries
involved. However, once the EMU came into effect, the principal
economic regulatory mechanism, the SGP, failed to harmonize national
economies the way the drafters of that legislation had hoped it would, as
discussed below. As a result, economic harmonization failed in many
respects while the ECB's monetary union continued to operate.
In other words, in the first few years of the monetary union, the
broader concept of economic cooperation was replaced with an emphasis
on controlling inflation and deficit levels across the entire European
Union. For the ECB, that meant keeping inflation low. In 1994, Dyson
wrote:
The EMS and EMU policy process has been captured by
a mainstream economics whose intellectual history
involves a return to 'sound money' policy ideas; and,
with the Treaty of European Union, the EC has in effect
'constitutionalized' a set of economic ideas that,
preoccupied with price stability, risk neglecting sensible
and effective demand management at the Community

28. Id.
29. KRUGMAN, supra note 18, at 177.
30. See id. at 177-78.
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level. In this respect the treaty is more than a general
procedural framework for achieving EMU; it is
programmatic in an economic sense, imbalanced in the
repertoire of policy instruments that it bestows on the
EC and vulnerable to changing circumstances ... . 31
Regardless of the failures of economic coordination efforts in the
early years of the EMU, the basic principle that the fiscal policies within
a monetary union must cooperate remains true. That assertion is not
the same as insisting that all the countries achieve the same deficit
levels. The welfare of an economic union depends primarily on the idea
that deficit levels of the countries involved must be compatible, but that
does not always mean they must be the same.
B. The European Central Bank: Born out of Austerity
Unfortunately, the ECB was created in anticipation of a eurozone in
which all the countries would have the same or substantially similar
economic policies. However, as discussed above, the key to a functioning
economic union is compatibility, but not necessarily homogeneity,
among participants' fiscal policies. In the words of George Soros:
The ECB operates under asymmetric guidelines: It is
constitutionally obligated to be concerned only with
maintaining price stability, not full employment;
Germany still lives with the memory of the Weimar
Republic's runaway inflation, which served as a prelude
to the Nazi regime. Both considerations militate against
fiscal irresponsibility and unlimited money creation.
This should favor the euro as a store of value, but the
internal tensions within Europe work in the opposite
direction.32

Because the purpose of the bank was price stability, Germany
wanted a strongly independent bank, 33 but if maintaining the euro's
overall stability means making entire Member State populations suffer
hardship, the European Union should be able to use the ECB's

31. DYSON, supra note 7, at 231-32.
32. GEORGE SORos, THE CRASH OF 2008 AND WHAT IT MEANS: THE NEW PARADIGM FOR
FINANcIAL MARKETS 196 (2009).
33. Laurence Gormley & Jakob de Haan, The Democratic Deficit of the European
Central Bank. 21 EURoPEAN LAW REVIEW 95. 110 (1996).
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resources to salvage devastated economies. 34 If that means an injection
of cash from the ECB is called for, raising inflation and lowering the
real debt level, so be it. Furthermore, allowing indebted countries to
kick-start their economies is a step in the right direction toward price
stability throughout an EMU in which the people of all the Member
States could actually spend money.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE TO AUSTERITY

A. Mechanics of the ProposedAlternative Solution
Were Greece to receive such loans, the European Union would be
able to take advantage of a key element of its infrastructure: the
Customs Union.35 Following Stiglitz's analysis above, this Note proposes
that the European Union and the ECB spend money on structural
changes in Greece, thus helping to move its economy into new sectors. It
seems to make most sense to try and revitalize the Greek industrial and
manufacturing sector, as it is a sector of the economy in which southern
Europe has traditionally had trouble being competitive. But, injecting
money into Greek manufacturing and industry will not do much good if
no one is going to buy the products.
Indeed, after the start of the EMU, the GIPSI countries (Greece,
Italy, Portugal, Spain, Ireland) began borrowing large sums and
applying them to manufacturing, thereby driving wages up and causing
unit labor costs to increase. As a result, "[m]anufacturing in Europe's
south became uncompetitive, which in turn meant that the countries
that were attracting huge money inflows began running correspondingly
huge trade deficits."36 Since Greek consumers (and indeed those of
several Member States) now have very little money to spend, the
resulting products in the proposed alternative solution would have to be
sold and bought by people in other countries, especially Germany.
Krugman argues that one way for Germany and Spain, for example, to
create complementary economic policies would be for the ECB to offer
easy money loans to Spain, while strong economies like Germany
simultaneously engaged in fiscal stimulus. 3 7
A simplified version of such a plan could involve Germany lowering
taxes and spending more government money on social programs,
thereby putting more money into the hands of the German population.
This would cause German employment to remain constant, at least for a
34. See CRAIG & DE BiRcA, supra note 11, at 706.
35. See id. at 611.
36. KRUGMAN, supra note 18, at 175.
37. See id. at 180.
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while, while German wages and costs would rise.38 Then, the GIPSI
countries would engage in very tightly controlled government spending
on industry and manufacturing thanks to more affordable loans from
the ECB; for example, keeping inflation in those countries significantly
lower than what it would be in Germany (but still much higher than the
current deflation in those countries). In turn, exports from the GIPSI
countries would have more demand in countries like Germany that have
more spending power. The result would be higher inflation in the whole
of the European Union, which, over time, would chip away at the
national debts of struggling countries relative to GDP.
In order for such a plan to be sustainable the GIPSI countries would
have to be able to attract investments from sources other than the
Troika. 39 Because the GIPSI countries do not presently have their own
currency or a central bank from which to borrow in that currency, part
of the current crisis was a self-fulfilling panic by investors. 40 Investors
caught wind of the rising debt in Greece, for instance, and in an effort to
avoid losses caused by potential default, they pulled out their
investments, causing default on a much larger scale. 41 Rightfully so,
investors are now wary of such a catastrophe repeating itself since the
chances of default are high. Not only would the ECB have to loan money
for spending to the GIPSI countries, but it would also have to guarantee
to buy government bonds of Euro nations if investors began to pull out
their investments on a large scale.
As a step in the right direction, the European Union created an
institution that could guarantee adequate liquidity and avoid the selffulfilled panic discussed above: the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM), which took effect in 2012.42 The ESM is a bailout mechanism to
which Member States in need can apply for aid subject to the review of
the Troika. 43 In addition, the ECB has guaranteed to buy bonds from
countries that have received approval for loans from the ESM. The
current effectiveness of this guarantee is discussed below.

38. See id.
39. See Macias, supra note 10, at 267 (noting that despite the Troika's bailout
measures in 2010, Greece's recession continued to worsen).
40. See KRUGMAN, supra note 18, at 182.
41. See id. at 183.
42. About the ESM, EUROPEAN STABILITY MECHANISM, http://www.esm.europa.eu (last
visited Dec. 22, 2013) (describing the relationship between the ESM and the member
states).
43. Id.
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B. Legal Reforms Required for the Viability of the ProposedAlternative
Solution
In practice, there are several legal, political, and structural
impediments to the solution proposed above. The ECB has always had a
substantial amount of independence from the rest of the EU law-making
structure, as provided by Articles 130 and 282(3) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).44 The ECB is independent
from the control of both the EU governmental structure and the
Member State governments. Furthermore, the ECB has its own lawmaking powers that are independent from the ordinary legislative
procedure of the European Union. In the years following the Lisbon
Treaty, some secondary Community legislation has been determined by
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to have the ability to modify some
of the statutory provisions governing the ECB, generally on the basis of
352 TFEU. The Court noted "the general competence for the
Community legislature to legislate in fields where it does not have in
another provision of the EC Treaty a more specific competence to ensure
that the objectives of the Community are met."45
Nevertheless, the ECB remains free from the political decisions of
the Community. The ECB was founded mostly according to "German
desires to have an ECB which mirrored closely the powers and status of
the Bundesbank." 46 Like the Bundesbank, the ECB does not have to
coordinate its price stability or inflation targets with the Member
States, and so by design, "the short-term interests of certain Member
States, or even the EU institutions, [cannot] sway the ECB."47
Obviously, this fundamental characteristic of the ECB would appear
to stand in the way of any embodiment of the solution proposed above,
such as for Germany to coordinate a domestic fiscal stimulus package
with an influx of cash from the ECB to GIPSI countries designed to
raise inflation levels throughout the EMU. If Germany were to propose
such cooperation (which, based on Germany's history with inflation, is
perhaps unrealistic), the ECB would be under no obligation to comply.
In addition, if the ECB were to propose it, the German government
would be able to refuse to engage in fiscal stimulus.
If no EU body or Member State could order such a fiscal and
monetary program, a program would instead have to be born out of a
sophisticated agreement negotiated outside of the formalized
44. See CRAIG & DE BfJRCA, supra note 11, at 706.
45. Chiara Zilioli & Martin Selmayr, The Constitutional Status of the European
CentralBank, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 355, 379 (2007).
46. CRAIG & DE BORcA, supra note 11, at 706.
47. Id.
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governmental powers of the European Union. Then, buttressed by
existing or newly reformed economic coordination laws, it would
regulate the inflation of the countries that receive loans from the ECB.
In other words, many governmental bodies would have to come together
to formalize a treaty. This would not be a treaty in the sense of
Maastricht or Lisbon (though, as will follow, the TFEU and TEU
(Treaty on European Union) may have to be amended to allow it), but
"treaty" in the more general sense of the word: a formally concluded and
ratified agreement between countries. 48 The bodies involved would
primarily be the German government and the ECB, but the
participation-preceding and subsequent to the negotiations about new
economic coordination laws-of the EU legislative bodies and the
governments of Member States receiving loans would be critical. In
addition, the governments of the other Member States would have to
ratify any treaty amendments that would be necessary.
Once again, Germany's hatred of inflation would be an
extraordinarily difficult obstacle to overcome, so its commitment to
engage in fiscal stimulus would have to be in exchange for significant
concessions on the part of the debtor countries, and perhaps the
European Union in general. Since the whole point of such an
arrangement would be to reduce the debt of struggling Member States,
such concessions could not be monetary in nature, as discussed below.
In order for the EU legislative bodies and Germany to be able to
influence the specific loans the ECB would provide to Greece, the ECB
would have to decline to enforce its right of independence from the other
EU bodies, as "there is [no] .

.

. formal provision allowing the other EU

institutions to override the choices made by the ECB."49 However, the
ECB is not prohibited from accepting the advice of the EU governmental
bodies or Member States. Ideally, the ECB would come to the conclusion
that since its own structure was modeled after the German
Bundesbank, a commitment from Germany to engage in such an
uncharacteristic fiscal stimulus program would be a persuasive
indication that the ECB's German-inspired independence from political
influence was no longer prudent in the current crisis.
If, however, the ECB refused to cooperate and insisted on
completely controlling the loans, as is its prerogative granted by the
TFEU, the articles of the TFEU governing the ECB would have to be
amended. The Treaty of Lisbon's Ordinary Revision Procedure, found in
Article 48 of the TEU, provides the procedure for such an amendment.
48. See Treaty Definition, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY, http://www.
oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195392883.001.0001/men-usl300120?rskeyWVkOQm&resut=83769 (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
49. CRAIG & DE BORCA, supra note 11, at 706.
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The procedure would first involve the president of the European Council
calling a European Convention: a gathering of national governments,
national parliamentarians, members of the European Parliament, and
representatives from the European Commission.50 At the European
Convention, these legislators of the European Union would draft
changes to the ECB's Treaty Articles.5 ' Ideally, the European
Convention would not have to make any changes to the ECB's structure
that would be too dramatic, but instead would do the bare minimum to
allow the EU legislative and executive bodies to supervise the loans
made to the GIPSI countries. Perhaps this could take the form of adding
a fiscal emergency procedure, calling for the ECB's independence to be
suspended if all the EU countries agree that the fiscal emergency
procedure should be set in motion. To preserve the credibility of the
ECB's core characteristic of independence, such a fiscal emergency
procedure could stipulate that to suspend the ECB's independence, the
bodies of the European Union would have to meet the same unanimity
as it takes to amend a treaty article. This would dispel the fear that in
times of stability or when it is otherwise unnecessary, the ECB's
independence would not be overrun for capricious political reasons.
Following draft revisions at the European Convention, the proposed
revisions would go to an Intergovernmental Conference, where all the
heads of state of the Member States would have to sign in order for the
revisions to be ratified. 52
When it comes to preventing self-fulfilling panic on the part of
investors, the ECB has stated that it only guarantees to buy bonds if the
Member State in question is still complying with the terms of its MOU
for receiving loans. 5' As discussed above, an MOU issued to indebted
Member States up to this point have been in the form of austerity
measures, so in order for the ECB's guaranteed bond-buying to
neutralize the problem of self-fulfilling panic in the context of the
proposed alternative solution, the current MOU must be adapted to
allow for some deficit spending.

50. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 48, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012
O.J. (C 326) 41-43.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Press Release, European Central Bank, Technical Features of Outright Monetary
Transactions (Sept. 6,2012), httpJ/www.ecb.europa.euipress/pr/date2012html/prl2O906l.enhtml
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C. Selling the Proposed Solution
1. Germany
At this point it is important to consider two of Germany's potential
basic goals under such a proposed alternative solution, one of which is
forward-looking, and the other backward-looking. First, Germany would
want to put procedures in place to ensure that in the future, Member
States that have proven to be irresponsible cannot repeat their
transgressions. Second, Germany would want Greece to atone for the
damage they have caused the monetary union. Greece could make an
excellent case for a concession that would meet both of Germany's goals,
which is to turn over competence of some, if not all of their economic
policies to the European Union. As applied to the first goal, such a
change would alleviate German concerns that Greece would not hold up
its end of the bargain, and if Germany were to bend over backwards and
engage in stimulus and raise inflation, a failure by Greece satisfy its
obligations would be utterly unacceptable to Germany. Furthermore,
Greece would have very little bargaining power at the negotiation table,
and Germany's representatives in the EU legislative and executive
bodies would be able to weigh in on precisely which industries would
receive loans from the ECB. Collectively, the European Union would
mandate exactly how the Greek stimulus would unfold and the
statistical requirements Greece must satisfy by certain deadlines.
Because of Greece's history of reporting false fiscal statistics to the
European Union, the European Union would directly monitor Greece's
finances. 54
As applied to the second goal, a Greek surrender of control of its
own economic policies in the form of EU legislation would be a
significant price to pay. It would be a very public admission of guilt and
responsibility that would be ratified into law, evoking the peer pressure
sanctions in the SGP of which the European Union seems to be so fond.
Furthermore, since the European Union is a transnational union of
independent nations that has always treasured its autonomy, such a
surrender of control would have been unthinkable only a decade earlier.
In sum, a commitment from Greece to surrender future control of its
economic policies to the European Union would be a persuasive
bargaining chip that could convince Germany to agree to an alternative
solution like the one proposed.
However, another huge obstacle in the way of Germany agreeing to
participate in such a strategy is the Greek people's economic and fiscal
54. Macias, supra note 10, at 266-67.
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culture, an obstacle that is not easily subjected to political control and
fiscal strategy. As Michael Lewis's firsthand account of his time in
Greece describes, Greece has a very large black market, high corruption
scores, and pervasive habits of tax fraud and evasion.55 These socioeconomic features are not present to the same degree in any other
eurozone Member State, further illuminating the naivet6 of including
Greece in the eurozone at all. However, if the Greek government and
people were able to show Germany, the IMF, and the ECB that they
could improve the enforcement of tax collection, for example, it would
make a solution as proposed above more plausible.
When Germany and France persuaded the European Union not to
enforce sanctions against them after they violated the deficit provisions
of the SGP, they referred to the "growth" aspect of the SGP. The Pact
has an unmistakable commitment to facilitating employability: in 1997,
the European Council declared that priorities of convergence must be
"improving competitiveness, labour-, product- and services-market
efficiency, education and training, and to making taxation and social
protection systems more employment-friendly."5 6 Accordingly, German
Chancellor Gerhard Schroder declared in 2003 that there are "phases in
the economy when one has to stress growth more than budget
consolidation."5 7
For Greece, Spain, and other EMU Member States, the current
crisis calls for growth and facilitation of employability. While this Note's
proposed alternative solution admittedly calls for drastic and
uncharacteristic economic adjustments on the part of Germany, the idea
of Germany standing in the way of Greece and Spain's growth is
hypocritical, as is their continued insistence on severe austerity
measures.
George Soros argues that if the European Union does not obtain the
kind of political control over economic policy described above, a possible
solution to Europe's identity crisis is for Germany to withdraw from the
EMU.5 8 His argument is that "if Germany were to exit and leave the
common currency in the hands of the debtor countries, the euro would
fall and the accumulated debt would depreciate in line with the

55. Michael Lewis, Beware of Greeks Bearing Bonds, VANITY FAIR (Oct. 1, 2010),
http://www.vanityfair.comlbusiness/features/2010/10/greeks-bearing-bonds-201010.
56. Roger J. Goebel, Economic Governance in the European Union: Should Fiscal
Stability Outweigh Economic Growth in the Stability and Growth Pact?, 31 FORDHAM
INTL L.J. 1266, 1298 (2008).
57. Id. at 1328.
58. George Soros, The Tragedy of the European Union and How to Resolve It, THE N.Y.
REVIEW OF BooKs (Sept. 27, 2012), available at http://www.nybooks.comlarticles/archives/
2012/sep/27/tragedy-european-union-and-how-resolve-it/.
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currency."5 9 Soros's theory does appear to make sense in economic
terms, and it would mitigate some of the limits of the European Union's
current global governance structure. However, Germany is the EMu's
largest economy and one of the least volatile in the world. A German
exit from the monetary union might reduce the debt of the GIPSI
countries in the short term, but the overall value of the euro in the longterm would suffer.
2. The European Union
In 2010, the EU Commission asked Italian economist and soon-to-be
Prime Minister Mario Monti to submit a report on the state of the single
market in the European Union. Monti identified three main challenges
facing the single market: erosion of the political and social support for
the single market, uneven policy attention given to developing a single
market (particularly, unfinished business in expansion to new sectors),
and a sense of complacency that the single market has already been
achieved.60
The solution that this Note proposes would positively address the
second and third of Monti's challenges, as it would be both a deliberate
change in policy that would use the EU single market to expand the
Greek economy into new sectors, and it would be anything but a display
of complacency that the single market has already been achieved. As for
the first challenge, the dilemma there is very real, as there is much
apprehension throughout Europe concerning the practicality of the
single market, and the European Union has yet to take substantial
steps to achieve a single market. The execution of this Note's strategy
would face significant unpopularity, which would perhaps be the most
significant threat to its plausibility.
IV. EU-IMPOSED LABOR LAW REFORM OF GREECE IS COMPATIBLE WITH
THE PROPOSED SOLUTION

In her critique of the European Union's austerity measures against
Greece, Joanna Pagones argues that the conditions the European Union
imposed that modified the Greek labor system were both harmful to
Greek laborers and beyond the scope of the European Union's
competence. 61 She argues these labor-focused austerity measures are

59. Id.
60. MARIO MONTI, A NEW STRATEGY FOR THE SINGLE MARKET 6, 9 (2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eulinternal market/strategy/docs/monti-reportfinal_10_05_2010_en.pdf.
61. See generally Pagones, supra note 22.
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harmful to Greek laborers because they compelled the traditionallycentralized labor unions in Greece to decentralize, meaning unions
would be firm-based, and since the Greek workforce is not experienced
in negotiating at the firm level (or, in essence, without the clout of a
very powerful union behind them), the workers' bargaining power would
be very low. 62
If the European Union was to modify the functioning of the ECB by
allowing moderate and controlled inflation in the GIPSI countries, while
Germany simultaneously engaged in fiscal stimulus, certain EU
austerity measures (including labor law reforms) would theoretically be
very beneficial. As of July 2014, Greece's unemployment is at 26.4
percent, but as of July 2014, its inflation rate is less than 0 percent (-0.8
percent, to be exact).63 If inflation rose too quickly in Greece and the
high unemployment figure remained substantially the same, the result
would be stagflation. Decreased bargaining power on the part of Greek
workers would theoretically keep wages low, helping achieve the abovestated goal of checking the inflation levels. Unemployment would go
down; naturally, this would mean more people would be making at least
some money, as opposed to the present situation: being unemployed.
This would raise inflation above 0 percent and simultaneously further
the ECB's desire to keep inflation moderate as opposed to high.
Pagones also argues that the labor-focused austerity measures the
European Union imposed on Greece were in violation of the EU
Treaty. 64 She cites Article 156 of the TFEU, which states that when it
comes to labor laws, the European Union "only has the authority to
encourage cooperation between Member States by making studies,
delivering opinions, and arranging consultations to improve working
conditions."6 5 Furthermore, she cites Article 126 of the TFEU that
"where an excessive deficit exists, the European Union shall adopt
recommendations addressed to the Member State."66 Finally, she cites
the SGP, which "allows Member States to take the corrective budgetary
action they deem necessary to meet the objectives of their stability or
convergence."67
Pagones's conclusion, that the labor law reforms in Greece as
imposed today are in violation of the European Union's treaty and
legislation, is probably accurate. 68 But as discussed above, the
62. Id. at 1554.
63. Greece Unemployment Rate, supranote 24.
64. Pagones, supranote 22, at 1547.
65. Id. at 1549.

66. Id.
67. Id. at 1550.
68. Id.
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provisions in EU law that grant the Member States autonomy in
regulating their own economic policies have greatly contributed to the
current crisis in the EMU. For one thing, they grew out of negotiations
that occurred before the EMU took effect. Member States that wanted to
join the EMU agreed to coordinate their economic policies among each
other as a condition of entry into the EMU.69 In addition, the economic
conditions of the Member States were much better at that time, so the
goals of the SGP seemed attainable. The thought was that the beginning
of the EMU was so quickly approaching that Member States' economic
policies could be tweaked and teased into falling into the SGP's
guidelines. 70 Finally, soft-law policies of enforcement like those in the
SGP proved to be ineffective in practice once the EMU was established.
France and Germany both violated the SGP and avoided sanctions, and
other countries continued to violate the SGP and receive sanctions that
did not alter their decision making process.71
The articles of the TFEU to which Pagones cites are similar in
nature to those in the SGP; that is, they are soft-law measures that
hinge upon the assumption that, during economically stable
circumstances, Member States will be able to influence other Member
States to fall in line through diplomacy, without the European Union's
intervention. Economic policy, and labor law in particular, was deemed
such a crucial element of national sovereignty that to give it over to the
European Union would be unacceptable. 72
While the laws as they exist do not appear to permit the labor-based
austerity measures that the European Union imposed on Greece, the
present dire condition of Greece and the other GIPSI countries demand
that the laws be adapted. This would be done using the "ordinary
revision procedure" in a similar fashion as the one outlined in the
proposed reform of the ECB above. The consequences of having a
monetary union comprised of countries with their own economic policies
have gone on far too long and have been far too catastrophic for the
economic policy laws of the EMU to remain the same.
V. LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
In studying the effectiveness of any global governance system, the
more novel portion of the concept, "global," risks to steal attention from
the more mundane half, "governance." When a country opens up its
borders and other countries begin to influence both culture and the
69.
70.
71.
72.
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marketplace, there is always a fear that feelings of national and
regional pride as well as domestic autonomy will stand in the way of
integration. However, Pieter Van Houten largely disputes this notion
while discussing the reactions of a variety of regions of Europe that
were subjected to economic integration strategies in the 1960s and
1970s. Van Houten asserts that demands for regional autonomy in the
face of integration mostly arose "from regions with a long history of
regionalism (such as Catalonia, Scotland, and Flanders), which are not
representative of most European regions. There is no evidence that
these developments constitute a general and uniform trend."73
Nevertheless, the expectation persists that a country has the potential
for negative reactions domestically when it begins to integrate as a
result of globalization, and different remedies for such a conflict are
widely advocated and disseminated.
But, because globalization (specifically in the context of global
governance structures like the European Union) forces countries to
adapt their policies and surrender some policy making to some kind of
transnational body, that transnational body must make very important
policy decisions. In other words, it must govern, plain and simple, and
there is nothing to suggest that the nature of a global governance
structure should call for a different general policy-making formula than
that used by any other governing body. Policy making at every level is
dominated by what has been learned from policies of the past, and as
Dyson writes, this is true for the EMU:
The dynamics of policy change in European monetary
integration and union have their basis in evolving
perceptions of policy failure. Policy learning is driven by
these perceptions. A process of learning is indicated
when the goals or instruments of policy are adjusted in
light of past experiences and new information. In other
words, we are studying the way in which ideas about
economic and monetary policy are changing: ideas about
policy goals, about policy instruments and about the
precise use of policy instruments. In doing so, we are
able to make judgments about 'levels' of policy learning
and change. At the lowest level, there are incremental
changes in the way that policy instruments are used say specific interventions or interest rate changes; then
73. Pieter Van Houten, Globalization and Demands for Regional Autonomy in Europe,
in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL EcoNoMY: POLITICAL AuTHORITY IN TRANSITION 110, 123
(Miles Kahler & David A. Lake, eds., 2003); John Tomaney, Review of Keating 1998, 24
INT'L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 498-99 (2000).
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we can identify the 'higher-order' incrementalism of
like
new
policy
instruments,
developing
new
mechanisms of intervention or the adoption of wider or
narrower margins of fluctuation; and, finally, can be
found the level of radical or 'heroic' policy change, in
which a new rationale for policy is defined based on
changed policy goals as well as instruments.
Characteristically, 'heroic' change involved the opening
of the policy process to new actors and ideas.74
The EMU is currently in need of "heroic" policy change: new policy goals
as well as instruments. As of this time, the European Union has been
addressing a catastrophe with policies that indicate that it has not
learned from history. Instead, with Germany dominating negotiations,
policies (like austerity measures) are implemented with an aim to keep
the crisis contained within the countries that caused it.
The global executive of the European Union, at least in the context
of the EMU, is not an EU-level body. The EU government structure
must defer its power in the most critical of economic issues to competing
domestic executives that operate according to their own domestic
agendas. In times of crisis, their interests are polar opposites: the
European Union is concerned with the economic well-being of the entire
union, whereas certain Member States are concerned primarily with
their own economic well-being; in addition, as discussed above, they feel
no sympathy for countries that are in crisis.
This dilemma displays the limits of a global governing structure like
the European Union, which are in large part due to the European
Union's origins. In essence, the European Union is in the midst of a
debilitating identity crisis, and, unfortunately, it is similar to the one
that Dyson described in 1994:
The EC's institutional structure creates, at one level, a
"supergame" of repeated Council bargaining, removing
the incentive to cheat on one's EC partners by the threat
of being punished in later or even simultaneous
bargaining;
at another level, domestic "trigger
mechanisms" in the form of withdrawal of political
support if the costs of integration are judged to outweigh
the benefits.7 5

74. DYSON, supra note 7, at 93.
75. Id. at 302.
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The European Union was formed initially, and continued to take
shape heading into the EMU, as a coalition of autonomous governments
that agreed to limit their own sovereignty and submit to the control of a
transnational government.76 Following the world wars, the founders of
the European Union (and its former coalitions) theorized that if the
countries of Europe were strongly linked economically, the violent and
costly events of the first half of the twentieth century would not be able
to reoccur. 77
However, for legitimate and insurmountable political reasons, the
Member States insisted that they retain control over many of their own
policies, particularly economic ones. Agreeing not to tax imports from
other EU countries is one thing, but the Member States wanted to tax
their own citizens, operate their budgets, and regulate their financial
markets according to the methods they determined on their own.78 The
result of this power struggle is essentially that Member States could
have fiscal policies that were in discord with those of others in the
European Union. Fabian Amtenbrink and Jakob De Haan characterized
this relationship as "an asymmetric two-pillar structure, splitting
competences between the Community and the Member States."79 Their
analysis continued:
The competence for the execution and, to a considerable
extent, also for the formulation of economic policy has
been left with the Member States. Arguably, at the time
of the drafting of the provisions on EMU this not only
reflected the diversity between the Member States'
economic structures and economic developments and the
different beliefs of what economic policy can and cannot
achieve, but also the political conviction of the Member
States at large that fiscal policy should essentially
remain a national competence.80
When such discord persisted after the monetary union took effect,
irresponsible fiscal policies in one country weakened the currency of
Member States that might have had perfectly responsible fiscal
policies.8 1
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77. Id.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 88.
Amtenbrink & De Haan, supra note 17, at 1078.
Id.
See id. at 1093.

THE GREEK DEBT CRISIS

197

While minimally effective measures were in place at the EU level to
intervene in the Member States that had spent irresponsibly, Member
States that had responsible fiscal policies were still mostly in control of
those same fiscal policies. Therefore, even if it were in the best interests
of the monetary union for the responsible countries to adapt and
counteract according to the conditions of the struggling countries, the
responsible countries are under no obligation to do so. Instead, they
engage in blame shifting, insisting that they are not at fault and should
not have to pay for the irresponsibility of others.
Consequently, the current situation arises because countries are in
extreme debt and share a currency with other countries that refuse to
cooperate with them. The only way to maintain the overall stability of
the euro, then, is for debtor countries to engage in severe austerity
measures and suffer long periods of high unemployment to slowly lower
wages. However, this results in deflation, which causes the real value of
their debt to rise, making their debt seem all the more
insurmountable. 82
In the absence of a monetary union, Greek citizens would not suffer
through such a prolonged period of austerity because their government's
fiscal decisions would not have such a strong impact on the currencies of
other countries. Furthermore, countries like Germany would be more
justified in refusing to adapt to help Greece. The European Union (in its
current and former forms) has always had the goal of coordinating the
economic policies of the Member States, and from the creation of the
European Coal and Steel Community until the implementation of the
EMU, it was still feasible for Member States to retain control over their
domestic economic policies. However, this feasibility vanished when the
Member States agreed to implement the EMU, an agreement that
aimed to ensure the well-being of all participants and transform
domestic fiscal decisions of Member States into global fiscal decisions
affecting the entire EMU.
In forming a monetary union, the EMU took a drastic step toward
global governance, yet the strongest Member States are determined to
have economic autonomy at the domestic level. The current crisis has
shown that effective global monetary governance and domestic
autonomy over economic decision making are mutually exclusive. When
they coexist, the monetary union actually serves to worsen the
conditions of countries in debt. For Greece, this is not progress-it is
poverty-a stark contrast to the goals of a monetary union, and indeed,
the European Union as a whole.

82. KRUGMAN, supranote 18, at 181-82.
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CONCLUSION

In the words of John Maynard Keynes: "The boom, not the slump, is
the time for austerity."8 3 That principle remains as true today as it was
during the years following the Stock Market Crash of 1929, and the
European Union's adherence to strict austerity measures in response to
the debt crises of the GIPSI countries has similarly exacerbated the
issues facing those indebted countries.
Economic theory is a very complicated and contentious subject of
debate, and at the opposite end of the spectrum from this Note's
arguments, there are some critics, such as Shawn Tully of Fortune
Magazine, who suggest that the European Union could afford to enact
even more severe austerity measures. 84 In his piece criticizing Paul
Krugman, Tully focuses in on France, noting that under President
Chirac in the mid-2000s, France's economy was competitive with
Germany's in many respects, and that Chirac's conservative economic
policies had helped bring about that success. Tully insists that France
must reduce spending in order to compete with Germany's economy on a
global level, arguing that "the benchmark for France's performance
shouldn't be Greece, Portugal, and Spain, but Germany, the U.S. and
the Asian nations that are both its biggest customers and rivals in world
trade." However, as argued in this Note, the relatively stable economic
metrics of the mid-2000s are illusory, as many European states,
including the ones in crisis now, had stable metrics at that time, which
can be attributed to a lack of foresight by investors and banks and the
fact that the global economy had not collapsed yet. Moreover, Tully's
reference to France's success in the mid-2000s only serves to affirm
Keynes's maxim about austerity: of course austerity worked for France
back then (the crash of 2008 had not happened yet). Tully's mistake is
that he considers France to be a wholly independent state actor, but as
evidenced by this Note and the failures of the EU governing body's
structure, it is not. France's economy and its fate, like the other Member
States', are tethered with a short rope to the ECB and the other
Member States.
Tully further insists that "[flor France, the problem is costs, and
that problem divides into two categories: expensive labor and old
plants." The proposed alternative solution in this Note seems to address
both of Tully's concerns for a country like France, as labor would move
to new Greek (and other struggling Member States) plants and the
83. Id. at xxiii.
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2013), auailable at http://fortune.com/2013/11/12/why-paul-krugman-is-wrong-aboutfrance/?iid=HP-River/ (Last visited Nov. 3, 2014).
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products would be sold at favorable prices in Member States like
France.
A "heroic" change in economic policy is in order for the EMU,
whether that takes the form of this paper's alternative proposed
solution or Soros's proposal of Germany leaving the EMU. At the
moment, the European Union has turned Greece into Sisyphus,
stubbornly forcing it to push the boulder of austerity up a steep
mountain, only to watch in vain as it rolls back down. Instead, Greece
needs the European Union to embody Odysseus and use bold and
ingenious tactics to lead the way to safety. The everyday needs of the
people in Greece and the other GIPSI countries are too pressing to stay
the course of the current austerity measures, and the global governance
system of the EMU must take political action to , resolve its
inadequacies.

